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Abstract  -  This  paper  aims  to  enhance  the  understanding  of  provincial  tax 
performance in China, paying special attention to the recent fiscal reforms in 
the 1980s and in 1994. Using provincial panel data for the period 1986-2004, 
our  analysis  consists  of  two  steps.  First,  a  combined  fixed  time  effects  and 
random provincial effects model is used to analyze the statistical relationship 
between  the  tax  share  in  GDP  and  economic  and  demographic  variables. 
Results indicate that the decentralized fiscal system over the period 1986–1993 
has had a positive impact on the tax share in GDP, whereas the recentralized 
fiscal  system  in  the  period  1994-2004  has  had  a  negative  impact.  Second, 
provincial  tax  effort  indices  are  calculated  to  estimate  potential  room  for 
additional  taxation.  The  findings  from  the  analysis  have  important  policy 
implications  on  the  redistribution  of  fiscal  resources  as  well  as  on  the 
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Taxation is a major source of government revenue that finances essential 
public  services  such  as  education,  health,  infrastructure  and  environmental 
protection. In developing countries in particular, greater investment in public 
services  is  required to raise  the  standard  of  living  and  increase the  pace  of 
economic development. However, countries or localities that need tax revenues 
the most face more difficulty in raising tax revenues. Some studies in this area 
suggest that the root of the problem lies in the governments‘ inadequate efforts 
to collect tax revenues based on their tax bases. For example, Tanzi (1992) 
found  that  tax  efforts  in  developing  countries  tend  to  be  lower  than  in 
industrialized countries.  
 
China has undergone several fiscal reforms with various forms of fiscal 
contracting systems (1978-1993) and later a tax sharing system (1994-present). 
This leads to the inevitable question: How have these fiscal reforms affected the 
tax performance of provincial governments? The objective of this paper is to 
answer this question using a detailed analysis of patterns in provincial finance. 
This  paper  predicts  tax  capacity  and  calculates  tax  effort  indices  using 
provincial data over the period 1986-2004.  
 
This study contributes to the field of public finance in three important 
ways. First, the research findings contribute to a better understanding of the tax 
performance of provincial governments in China. Second, the study provides 
insights into how the major fiscal reforms in1986 and 1994 have affected the 
tax performance of provincial governments. Third, the research has important 
policy implications for governments at different levels. For example,  for the 
purpose of redistribution, the Chinese central government must know not only 
the provinces‘ capacity to raise tax revenues, but also to what extent they have 
exploited their tax capacity. Provincial governments with high tax effort should 
be rewarded for their performance. Otherwise, the risk exists that the central 
government might spoil those provinces with low tax effort by subsidizing their 
deficits that are supposed to be financed through provincial tax base.  Finally, 
from the administrative perspective, since provincial governments do not have 
the right to change tax rates or decide what kind of tax they can levy, they have 
to focus on minimizing administrative costs. Therefore, this study provides the 
central  government  with  a  better  understanding  of  the  effectiveness  of  the 
current  administrative  reform  that  aims  to  reduce  costs  and  improve 
administrative efficiency. The paper proceeds as follows. Section one discusses 
previous research and different methodologies that have been used to measure 
tax capacity and tax effort. Section two reviews tax reforms in China. Section 
three  discusses  the  methodology  this  study  employs  and  describes  the  data. 
Section four discusses the model selection and empirical results. Section five 
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1. TAX PERFORMANCE: WHAT IS KNOWN ? 
 
Tax  performance  consists  of  two  distinct  measurements.  One  is  tax 
capacity,  the  measurement  of  a  government‘s  hypothetical  ability  to  raise 
revenue. The other is tax effort, which measures the extent to which a certain 
level of government actually has explored its available tax bases and utilized its 
tax capacity. Together, these two measurements of tax performance of a specific 
locality provide a picture of potential room for additional taxation for that place 
(Bahl, 1971; Bahl, 1972; Chelliah, 1971; Mertens, 2003; Tanzi, 1987; Tanzi, 
1992). The literature defines tax effort by dividing the actual collected tax by 
the tax capacity. This section discusses two major methods the literature has 
used to link tax capacity and tax effort.  
 
The  first  method  is  employed  by  the  Advisory  Commission  on 
Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR, 1981, 1982, 1987, 1990 and 1993) in the 
U.S. ACIR uses the representative tax system (RTS) and representative revenue 
system  (RRS)  to  measure  the  tax  capacity  and  tax  effort  of  all  U.S.  states. 
Although each state has different taxes, the RTS assumes a representative tax 
rate for every single tax across states, which is calculated by dividing the total 
actual revenues for a tax source from all states by the total estimated RTS/RRS 
base. Therefore, this methodology measures tax capacity by different taxes. For 
each revenue source, the tax capacity for every state is estimated by multiplying 
the RTS/RRS tax base by the representative tax rate. Correspondingly, a state‘s 
tax effort is calculated by dividing the actual tax collections by its capacity to 
collect taxes.  
 
The other method in the literature to connect tax capacity and tax effort, 
which is widely used in OECD countries, uses a regression approach. Most of 
the OECD working papers regress tax capacity on explanatory variables that 
might affect a country‘s ability to raise tax revenues. In this literature, most 
studies employ the ratio of actually collected tax over GDP as a measurement of 
tax capacity (Tanzi, 1992). Ratios to GDP are used for the reason that ―GDP 
includes  income  earned  locally  that  accrues  to  non-residents  and  excludes 
income received from abroad by residents. Since local income accruing to non-
residents  typically  is  taxed  while  remittances  from  abroad  are  not,  GDP 
produces a  more accurate  measure of taxable capacity‖  (Teera and  Hudson, 
2004). Therefore, the estimated tax share of GDP from such a regression is 
regarded as a measure of taxable capacity. Following this approach, tax effort is 
the ratio of actual tax share of GDP over estimated tax share of GDP (Mertens, 
2003). 
 
Since  tax  capacity  is  based  on  hypothetical  calculations,  different 
researchers focus on different sets of factors to capture such capacity. On the 
one hand, some studies emphasize economic and demographic variables, which 
are called ―tax handles‖ (Musgrave, 1969), such as GDP per capita, population, 
and trade share of GDP (Ansari, 1982; Mertens, 2003; Sagbas, 2001; Teera and 
Hudson,  2004;  Stotsky  and  Woldemariam,  1997).  On  the  other  hand,  some 
studies focus on social and institutional factors, such as the administrative and 
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other government institutions (Eltony 2002; Teera and Hudson, 2004; Warner, 
2001).  
 
Tax  capacity  analysis  has  traditionally  focused  on  economic  and 
demographic  characteristics.  The  literature  suggests  that  a  higher  level  of 
economic development reflects an increased demand for public expenditure and 
a greater taxable capacity to meet such demands, therefore a higher per capita 
income indicates a greater tax capacity (Teera and Hudson, 2004). Industry‘s 
share of GDP plays a positive role in generating tax revenue, as it is usually 
easier to collect tax from the industrial sector than from the agricultural sector 
given their relatively accurate accounting records of taxable resources (Bahl, 
1971; Bahl, 1972; Chelliah, 1971; Mertens, 2003; Tanzi, 1968; Tanzi 1987; 
Tanzi, 1992). Moreover, there exist more public services and activities in urban 
areas than in rural areas. Therefore, the higher the agricultural share of GDP, the 
less public services are needed, and the less tax revenue needs to be generated. 
Tax capacity also depends on the volume of international trade, which measures 
the degree of openness. Stotsky and Woldemariam (1997) argue that the tax 
share is positively related to the degree of openness of the economy.  
 
Other than the aforementioned variables, that are traditionally used to 
measure  the  tax  capacity,  more  tax  handle  variables  have  been  proposed  to 
capture the determinants of tax capacity more precisely. Ansari (1982) argues 
that  a  high  population  density  is  assumed  to  be  a  negative  indicator  of  tax 
capacity,  because  a  high  degree  of  congestion  is  considered  to  cause  more 
problems of tax exemptions. However, Teera and Hudson (2004) argue that the 
tax  collection  cost  will  be  reduced  in  a  densely  populated  area,  which  is 
expected to encourage governments to collect tax revenues. In addition, Sagbas‘ 
results show that there is a strong positive relationship between tax capacity and 
expenditure trends (Sagbas, 2001).  
 
Even though the literature emphasizes that the success of governments in 
exploiting tax potential and in attaining a taxation target depends to a large 
extent on their tax handles,  the role of institutional factors has been widely 
discussed as well. Recent research suggests that institutional factors could also 
be significant predictors of tax performance. Teera and Hudson (2004) state that 
variables such as levels of literacy, the administrative and political constraints 
on  the  fiscal  system,  and  social-political  values,  should  also  be  taken  into 
account to measure the overall willingness and ability of the government to 
raise taxes. In addition, Warner proposes that tax capacity is positively related 
to spatial effects, and it is negatively related to poverty and tax substitutes (e.g. 
state aid or federal aid) (Warner, 2001). Furthermore, Eltony (2002) argues that 
country-specific factors appear to be important determinants of tax share, e.g., 
the  political  system  and  other  institutions  of  the  government,  and  attitudes 
toward the government. 
 
In China, uniform national tax laws are set by the central government, 
whereas provincial governments are responsible for tax administration and may 
give  tax  concessions  to  State  Owned  Enterprises  (hereafter  called  SOEs). 
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the extent to which each provincial government exploits its tax base because 
this information will allow the central government to gain tighter control over 
the central and provincial tax systems. For example, the central government 
needs to inspire the revenue-raising incentives of provincial governments. In 
addition, it is better for the central government to have an overall picture of 
provincial tax collection, in case provincial governments offer their SOEs more 
tax concessions or tax holidays than necessary. However, few if any empirical 
studies have analyzed the tax performance of provincial governments in China. 
In their 1992 study, Bahl and Wallich used only two variables––per capita gross 
value  of  industrial  output  and  the  percentage  of  population  living  in  urban 
areas—to estimate the tax capacity of provincial governments in China in one 
single year (1986). In this context, this present study employs the economic and 
demographic variables mentioned above to analyze the tax capacity and  tax 
effort of provincial governments in China during 1986–2004. The reason why 
we  chose  this  period  is  that  there  were  two  main  fiscal  reforms  during  the 
period. The first, the ―Contracting System,‖ was introduced in 1986. The other, 
the ―Tax Sharing System,‖ began in 1994. This paper will compare the different 
effects of the two fiscal reforms on tax collection. 
 
2. FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION REFORM 
 
Fiscal decentralization is widely recognized as an essential component in 
China‘s  transition  to  a  market  economy,  and  advocated  by  many  for  its 
contribution to the country‘s remarkable economic performance over the last 25 
years.  The  country  has  made  substantial  efforts  to  break  down  its  highly 
centralized fiscal management system with various forms of fiscal contracting 
systems  (1978-1993)  and  later  a  tax  sharing  system  (1994-present)  (Shen, 
2008).  
 
A fiscal revenue sharing system replaced the highly centralized system in 
1980. From then on, the central and provincial governments each began to ‗eat 
in  separate  kitchens‘,  which  provided  sub-national  governments  with  an 
incentive to collect revenues. Under this system, central-provincial sharing rules 
were established by the central government; provincial-municipal relations were 
governed by the province; and this principle extended to lower levels. There 
were three basic types of revenues under the reformed system: central-fixed 
revenues, local-fixed revenues, and shared revenues. During the period 1980–
84,  about  80  percent  of  the  shared  revenues  were  remitted  to  the  central 
government and 20 percent were retained by local governments. The bases and 
rates of all the taxes, whether shared or fixed, were determined by the central 
government. Enterprises were supposed to pay taxes to the level of government 
they were subordinate to. Almost all revenues, except a few minor central-fixed 
revenues, were collected by local finance bureaus (Shen, 2008). 
 
The  uniform-sharing  formula  during  the  period  1980-1984  created 
undesired  surpluses  in  affluent  provinces  and  deficits  in  poor  provinces, 
although  the  reform  boosted  more  revenue  collection  in  many  localities.  In 
1985, the State Council redesigned revenue-sharing arrangements by varying 
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financially  weak  provinces  were  allowed  to  retain  more  revenues,  but  the 
wealthier  regions,  like  Shanghai,  Beijing,  Tianjin,  Liaoning,  Jiangsu,  and 
Zhejiang,  were  penalized  by  remitting  more  revenues  to  the  center.  As  a 
consequence, the revenues from these regions generally grew more slowly than 
the national average since the high level of remittance curbed local enthusiasm 
for expanding their tax bases (Shen, 2008).  
 
In  the  period  1988-1993,  the  ―fiscal  contracting  system‖  was 
implemented. This system requires each level of government to contract with its 
subordinate level to meet certain revenue and expenditure targets. The central 
government  signed  contracts  on  a  case-by-case  basis  with  the  provincial 
governments, specifying their remittance based on the profit of their enterprises. 
Six types of central-provincial revenue-sharing methods were adopted and each 
applied to some provinces
1. Consequently, all revenues were divided into two 
parts: the central fixed revenues and the local retained revenues. The provincial 
governments relied on their local retained revenues for their public expenditure 
requirements. In this case, to some extent, the provincial governments were self-
financed. In other words, the responsibility for meeting the expenditure needs of 
provincial governments was decentralized (Bahl and Wallich, 1992). 
 
Under  this  reform,  the  proportion  of  central  revenue  declined 
dramatically,  causing  a  huge  deficit  at  the  central  government  level.  In 
particular,  certain  categories  of  local  revenues  went  to  the  ―extra-budgetary 
fund‖ of the provincial government, which was not subject to sharing with the 
central government. Provincial governments tended to maximize their ―extra-
budgetary  fund.‖  Consequently,  two  ratios  (revenue/GDP  and  central/total 
revenue) eroded (see Figure 1), and the central government faced a huge deficit 
(Zhang and Zou, 1998). Therefore, in order to raise the ratio of central revenue 
over the total revenue, the central government introduced a new reform, the 
―Tax Sharing System,‖ in 1994. 
 
The 1994 fiscal reform was designed to base the fiscal relations between 
governments on the tax code: central, local, and shared taxes. Value-added tax, 
business  tax,  and  several  excise  taxes  were  introduced  both  at  the  central 
governmental  and  the  provincial  level.  The  biggest  tax  is  value-added  tax, 
which is a shared tax. From value-added tax, the central government takes 75%, 
which  accounts  for  a  major  portion  of  its  fiscal  revenue,  and  provincial 
governments retain only 25%. According to most scholars (Bahl and Wallich, 
1992;  Lin, Tao  and  Liu, 2003;  Wong,  1998),  the  overall  system  reforms  in 
China focused on the decentralization of economic management, which allowed 
the development of a greater autonomy for provinces and non-state sectors, but 
                                                                                              
1  For  example,  one  formula  was  ―contracted  sharing  rate  with  fixed  yearly  growth  rate  of 
revenue‖, which means the central-local revenue sharing rate and the yearly growth rate of local 
revenues were based on the revenue performance of the province over recent years and negotiated 
by the central and provincial governments. If the real growth rate was greater than the contracted 
rate,  the  province  could  keep  all  the  surpluses.  If  the  real  growth  rate  was  lower  than  the 
contracted rate, then the province had to make up the gap.  
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the 1994 fiscal reform actually recentralized the Chinese fiscal system. On the 
one  hand,  revenue  is  centralized  under  the  tax  sharing  system  because  the 
central government takes a considerable amount of revenue.  
 
On the other hand, since provinces keep only a small proportion of the 
total revenue, they need subsidies from the central government to meet their 
expenditure. In this respect, expenditure is also centralized. 
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Source : Shen, 2008. 
 
 
In terms of the outcome of these fiscal reforms, the 1980s fiscal reform 
led  to  a  decreased  overall  tax  share  of  GDP,  while  the  1994  fiscal  reform 
resulted in a contrary outcome. As shown in Figure 1 below, the general trend 
over time is an increase in the tax share of GDP from 10% to 15% since 1996 
(see Figure 2).  
 
Such a trend suggests that China has enjoyed increases in tax shares, and 
hence, better overall tax-collection efforts in the past decade.  
 
Theoretically, both the decentralization in 1980s and the recentralization 
in  1994  have  had  a  significant  impact  on  tax  capacity  and  tax  effort  of 
provincial governments in China. In this study, we use panel data analysis to 
capture the policy reactions of local governments to the central government tax 
reforms. 
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This  study  attempts  to  examine  the  effect  of  the  tax  base  on  the  tax 
capacity  of  provincial  governments  in  China,  and  therefore  the  dependent 
variable is the tax share of GDP actually collected and the independent variables 
are the agricultural share of GDP, industry‘s share of GDP, the trade share of 
GDP, and the population density. The relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables can be summarized by the equation below : 
 
) , , , , ( PopDensi Trade Agri Ind GDPpc f Taxshare  
 
Where : 
Taxshare = Tax to GDP ratio (% of GDP) 
GDPpc = GDP per capita, in thousand yuan 
Ind = the ratio of industry to GDP (% of GDP) 
Agri = the ratio of agriculture to GDP (% of GDP) 
Trade = the ratio of import and export to GDP (% of GDP) 
PopDensi = population density (People per Sq.Km) 
 
3.1. Tax share of GDP 
 
In this part, we will analyze the tax system of provincial governments 
before and after 1994, calculate the tax share of GDP as well as the tax growth 
rate, and discuss the tax buoyancy for each province.  
 
In the pre-1994 fiscal system, the most important tax is ―profits tax,‖ 
accompanied by value added tax, business tax, agricultural tax and so on. The 
central  government  stipulated  a  lump-sum  tax  obligation  from  provincial 
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obligation will increase annually by an agreed rate if there are additional profits 
accruing to their SOEs. Usually, it is a fixed tax obligation for several years, but 
sometimes  with  an  annual  increment  (Bahl  and  Wallich,  1992).  Therefore, 
Wong (1992) argues that, under the fixed tax obligation, increased profits of 
SOEs will lead to a decreased representative tax rate.   
 
In 1994, the tax sharing system consisted of central taxes, local taxes and 
shared  taxes.  Consumption  taxes,  tariffs  and  vehicle  purchase  taxes  are  all 
central taxes, while value added taxes, business income taxes, corporate income 
taxes and personal income taxes are shared taxes levied both at the central level 
and the local level. At the provincial level, China has introduced local taxes on 
very  limited  tax  bases,  including  resource  taxes,  urban  land  use  taxes, 
agriculture and related taxes, and taxes on contracts. Figure 3 uses 2005 data to 
demonstrate that value added tax and business tax usually comprise the largest 
share of taxes at the provincial level.  
 
 
Figure n°3 : Main Tax Items of Provincial Governments in 2005 
 
  Business Tax, 32%
  Value Added Tax, 
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  Company Income 
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Source : Shen, 2008. 
 
 
With respect to the average tax share of GDP for each province, as shown 
in  Figure  4,  Tibet  has  the  lowest  tax  share  of  GDP  (4.29%)  followed  by 
Chongqing, a new municipality entitled in 1996, and Sichuan, a province in the 
West region. Next comes Xinjiang, a minority province in the West region. 
Beijing  has  the  highest  share  of  GDP  (14.97%),  followed  by  the  two 
municipalities of Shanghai and Tianjin. Surprisingly Shandong, which has a 
high GDP per capita and is located on the east coast, has the fifth lowest tax 
share of GDP, while, Yunnan, a minority province in the Southwest region, has 
the fourth highest tax share of GDP. 
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Figure n°4 : The Average Tax Share of GDP  




Source : China Data Online (1986–2004). 
 
 
3.2. GDP per capita 
 
In Table 1 (see appendix), the provinces are ranked by average per capita 
GDP  during  the  1986–2004  period.  The  poorest  provinces,  which  have  the 
lowest average per capita GDP, are mostly inland provinces. On the contrary, 
the prosperous provinces with high per capita GDP are located in the coastal 
region.  
 
Figure 5 in the appendix shows that Shanghai, the largest metropolitan 
city,  had  the  highest  average  GDP  per  capita  over  the  period  1986–2004. 
Beijing, the nation‘s capital, ranked number two in GDP per capita, followed by 
Tianjin, the third municipality after Shanghai and Beijing. Following the three 
municipalities  rank  the  three  coastal  provinces  of  Zhejiang,  Jiangsu  and 
Guangdong. Guangdong is a coastal province favored by central government 
policies  and  was  among  the  first  to  undertake  economic  reforms  in  1978. 
Liaoning, one of China‘s heavy industrial centers, ranked number seven in per 
capita GDP. And Fujian ranks next, which has several special economic zones 
enjoying a special policy for the purpose of promoting economic development 
in  that  area.  This  can  be  accounted  for  by  a  special  ―open  door‖  policy 
implemented in Guangdong and Fujian in 1978. Under this policy, four special 
economic  zones  in  Guangdong  and  Fujian  were  established  in  1980.    In 
addition, 14 coastal cities were established as ―coastal open cities‖ in 1984, 
which all work in favor of the coastal provinces, especially in the Southeast 
region. Due to the special ―open door‖ policy, the coastal provinces were given 
not  only  special  opportunity  to  develop  their  economy,  but  also  special 
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local economic activities beyond those of other provinces (Lin, Tao and Liu, 
2003).  
 
At the other extreme, Guizhou, a mountainous minority province in the 
Southwest,  is  the  poorest  province,  followed  by  Gansu  in  the  West  region. 
Tibet, the minority province in the Southwest region, has very low per capita 
GDP. Sichuan, one of the most populous provinces in the West region, ranks 
the fourth poorest area, although its GDP is not among the lowest group. The 
Yunnan and Guangxi minority areas in the Southwest have very low per capita 
GDP. 
 
Overall,  most  coastal  provinces  in the  East region are  rich provinces. 
While on the contrary, the minority provincial areas of the Southwest and the 
Northwest are among the poorer provinces. 
 
3.3. Industry’s share of GDP 
 
―China‘s  fiscal  structure  depends  overwhelmingly  on  industry  for  the 
generation of revenues‖ (Wong, 1992). As Lin, Tao and Liu (2003) argue, since 
the  first  decentralization  reform  in  1957,  the  ownership  of  SOEs  has  been 
shifted  from  central  government  to  provincial  government.  The  tax  revenue 
collection of provincial governments naturally fell on the shoulders of SOEs, 
since the provincial governments put their effort in revenue collection on the 
profits  of  SOEs.  As  Shen,  Jin  and  Zou  state  in  their  report,  provincial 
governments‘ revenue heavily rely upon their SOEs. Especially under the fiscal 
contracting system, the interests of the provincial governments are tightly linked 
with  those  of  SOEs  (Shen,  Jin  and  Zou,  2006).  SOEs  and  provincial 
governments  have  a  strong  connection  not  only  because  of  the  revenue 
collection, but also because SOEs provide their employees with basic services, 
which are otherwise supposed to be provided by provincial governments, such 
as education, health care, and pension services (Lin, Tao and Liu, 2003). 
 
In the 1980s, over 80% of total local governmental revenues came from 
industry.  The tax system remained narrowly focused on SOEs. However, Wong 
argues  that  this  share  has  fallen  with  the  Chinese  fiscal  reform,  which  has 
introduced a competitive market and declining profits of SOEs (Wong, 1992).  
 
In the last decades, industry‘s share of GDP has grown in most of the 
provinces. Xinjiang (a minority province in the West region) has the highest 
growth rate of industry, followed by Hebei, an inland province in the North 
region. There are several exceptions, such as Tibet and Jianxi, where industry‘s 
share of GDP has decreased by respectively 2.77% and 1.37% (see Table 1 in 
appendix).  
 
The average share of industry of GDP during the period 1986 to 2004 is 
as low as 7.59% in Tibet, and as high as 51.94% in Shanghai (see Figure 6 in 
appendix). Shanghai is well known as a leading municipality in industrial and 
economic  development.    As  provinces  that  strongly  rely  on  heavy  industry, 
Heilongjiang  and  Liaoning,  in  the  Northeast  region,  have  relatively  high 
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positively affects tax capacity, since urban areas need more public services than 
rural  areas  and  in  addition,  there  is  a  lower  tax  administrative  cost  in  the 
industrial  sector  than  in  the  agricultural  sector  (Bahl,  1971;  Bahl,  1972; 
Chelliah, 1971; Mertens, 2003; Tanzi 1987; Tanzi, 1992). Therefore, we predict 
that industry‘s share of GDP is positively related to the tax share. 
 
3.4. Agriculture’s share of GDP   
 
The values of the average agricultural share of GDP range from 2.63% 
in  Shanghai  to  39.27%  in  Tibet.  Hainan,  the  island  in  the  south  of  China, 
Guizhou, Guangxi and Jiangxi, in less developed, mostly inland areas — all of 
these provinces‘ revenues mainly stem from agricultural sources. By contrast, 
Shanghai,  Beijing,  Tianjin,  Shanxi,  Liaoning  and  Heilongjiang  rely  less  on 
agriculture in their economy (See Figure 7 in appendix).  
 
During the period 1986 to 2004, most of the provinces experienced a 
decrease in the agricultural sector, as a great amount of agricultural land was 
converted  to  industrial  constructions  for  the  purpose  of  urban  development. 
Correspondingly, as shown in Table 1, agriculture‘s share of GDP has been 
diminishing.  For  example,  Shanghai,  Beijing  and  other  eastern  coastal 
provinces  all decreased their  agricultural share  by more  than  5%.  However, 
agriculture‘s share of the GDP growth rate is 33.98% in Chongqing, 29.70% in 
Tibet,  and  21.51%  in  Shanxi,  where  the  largest  number  of  coal  mines  are 
located (see Table 1 in appendix).  
 
Agriculture is supposed to have a higher tax administrative cost than 
other  sections,  and  rural  areas  enjoy  fewer  public  services,  which  all  make 
agriculture  a  negative  factor  that  affects  the  tax  capacity  of  a  jurisdiction. 
However, some scholars (Lin, Tao and Liu, 2003) argue that in China, rural 
taxes and land requisition are charged excessively and abusively. Under this 
circumstance, one could expect agriculture to have a positive impact on the 
provincial governments‘ revenue. 
 
3.5. Population Density 
 
Tax capacity also depends on the population density. In China, the most 
populous area is Shanghai where the average population density over period 
1986–2004 amounts to 2,100 inhabitants per Sq.Km, followed by the other two 
municipalities, Beijing and Tianjin. The least densely populated area is Tibet 
with only 2 inhabitants per Sq.Km, followed by Qinghai, Xinjiang and Inner 
Mongolia, all of which are minority areas (see Figure 8 in appendix). In China, 
the effect of the population density on tax capacity could lead to two diverging 
outcomes. On the one hand, a more populous area could result in a negative 
impact on tax capacity because of a high level of tax concession. On the other 
hand, a high density population area could play a positive role on the collection 
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3.6. Trade’s share of GDP 
 
Trade‘s share of GDP is used to measure the degree of openness, which is 
calculated by dividing the sum of imports and exports by GDP. The more open 
and the more developed the economies, the greater the tax bases. Figure 9 in the 
appendix shows that the most open area is Guangdong, which is also the first 
province that established a special economic zone and opened its door to the 
whole world. After this first open province rank Shanghai and Tianjin, the two 
coastal municipalities. Most of the coastal provinces, such as Fujian, Hainan 
and Jiangsu are very open too. The least open area is an inland province in the 
center,  Henan,  which  is  ―a  political  and  economic center  of  ancient  China‖ 
(Zhang  and  Zou,  1998).  Guizhou,  Qinghai,  Sichuan  and  Chongqing,  in  the 
Western inland area, rank second to fifth as the least open areas. 
 
The effects of the share of industry, agriculture and trade, as well as the 
impact of the population density on provincial governments‘ tax revenue will be 
tested in the next section.  
 
4. MODEL SELECTION AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
This  study  uses  panel  data  in  order  to  allow  for  time  and  province 
heterogeneity.  Without controlling the unobservable effects, the coefficients 
may be biased and inconsistent due to an omitted variable bias. For example, 
one  such  unobservable  factor  is  the  central  policy.  Both  fixed  effects  and 
random  effects  can  capture  heterogeneity  along  both  time  and  province 
dimensions. Specifically, three models are used: 
 
Pooled regression :  it it it X y                                                          (1) 
Fixed effects :  it i it it X y                                                                 (2) 
Random effects :  it i it it X y                                                     (3)    
 
In equations (1), (2) and (3), i is the index for individual provinces and t 
denotes time or year. If there are no unobserved effects, equation (1), OLS is 
suitable to provide unbiased, consistent and efficient estimates. In equation (2), 
the fixed effects, i , capture the fixed individual effects.  In equation (3), the 
province specific component in the error terms,  i   is a group specific random 
element, which allows these unobservable effects to be randomly distributed 
across cross-sectional units. 
 
When  choosing  between  a  fixed  effects  model  and  a  random  effects 
model for the time variable, we have chosen to use a fixed effects model. The 
reason is that we can only examine the effects of central fiscal on the tax share 
through the use of a fixed effects model.  If a random effects model is used, the 
time variable, whose coefficient represents the effect of the central fiscal policy, 
would  not  enter  the  regression  as  an  explanatory  variable  (it  enters  as  one 
component of the error term).  
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For provincial effects, two tests are conducted to help choose a desirable 
model among pooled regression techniques, random effects and fixed effects. 
The first test is the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier test for random 
effects against pooled OLS. The LM test statistic is 1290.59 (p<0.01). Hence 
we  reject  the  null  hypothesis  that  there  are  no  such  group-specific  random 
elements. Then, we go on to use the Hausman test for a fixed effects model 
versus a random effects model. The Hausman test statistic is 23.63 (p=0.37); on 
this basis, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. In this case, the random effects 
model is consistent and efficient, but the fixed effects model is not efficient 
although still consistent.  The reason is that there is no correlation between the 
included  independent  variables  and  the  random  effect  (Greene,  2003).  As  a 
result, a provincial random effects model has been implemented. In this paper, 
we  use  fixed  time  effects  and  random  provincial  effects  at  the  same  time, 
denoted by: 
 
                                                                             (4) 
 
i  is the unobservable province specific effect while  t  represents the fixed 
time effects that capture the impact of policy changes that affect all provinces 
each year. Estimations are carried out using the STATA statistical software 
package. 
 
The tax capacity of a province is measured as a function of its GDP per 
head, the share of agriculture, trade and industry of GDP, and the population 
density.  The  model  performs  generally  well  with  most  of  the  variables 
significant at the .01 level. The signs of the coefficients are generally consistent 
with expectations. The results show that tax capacity is negatively, though not 
significantly,  related  to  the  level  of  per  capita  GDP.  Also  consistent  with 
previous  findings,  industry‘s  share  plays  a  positive  role  in  determining  tax 
capacity. In other words, the higher the level of industrialization, the greater the 
capacity to raise taxes. Agriculture‘s and trade‘s share of GDP play a negative 
role in generating tax revenue. In addition, the importance of the population 
density as a major determinant of the level of tax capacity is not reliable, since it 
is not significant. 
 
When comparing the effects of decentralization and centralization, the 
results of my panel analysis show that they have opposite effects on the level of 
the tax share.  Decentralization had a positive and significant impact on the 
level of the tax share, while recentralization has had a negative impact. In the 
regression,  the  constant  is  dropped  so  that  all  of  the  time  dummies  can  be 
included.  The time effects are all significant except 1987. According to the 
Chow tests, the coefficients of the years after 1994 are significantly different 
from those before 1994.  The results can be seen clearly in Figure 10. We plot 
the coefficients of the time dummies. There was clearly a slump in 1994. 
 
Theoretically, there are two major views that can be used to explain the 
effect  of  decentralization  on  provincial  tax  capacity,  i.e.  Brennan  and 
Buchanan‘s ―Leviathan‖ model and Oates‘ model (Bird, Martinez-Vazquez and 
Benno, 2004).   
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Table n°2 :  Estimation Results for the Determinants of Tax Share  
using a Fixed Time Effects and Random Provincial Effects Model 
 
Independent Variable  Coefficients  Z Statistics 
GDPpc  -0.0004  -1.42 
Agrishare  -0.0950***  -3.41 
Indushare  0.0811***  3.16 
Trade  0.0110***  2.69 
Popdensi  0.0279  0.29 
year_1986  0.1152***  6.99 
year_1987  0.1099  -1.22 
year_1988  0.1025***  -2.92 
year_1989  0.1061**  -2.07 
year_1990  0.1031***  -2.76 
year_1991  0.0948***  -4.55 
year_1992  0.0845***  -6.58 
year_1993  0.0877***  -5.70 
year_1994  0.0417***  -15.43 
year_1995  0.0414***  -15.22 
year_1996  0.0441***  -14.47 
year_1997  0.0438***  -13.88 
year_1998  0.0451***  -13.08 
year_1999  0.0465***  -12.04 
year_2000  0.0458***  -11.67 
year_2001  0.0475***  -10.96 
year_2002  0.0476***  -10.64 
year_2003  0.0454***  -10.59 
year_2004  0.0456***  -9.51 
R
2  (Within)                      0.7483 
R
2 (Between)                      0.3848 
R
2 (Overall)                      0.5760 
LM                    1290.59 
H                       23.63 
 
Notes :   N=527.  ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01.   LM is the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier 
test for random effects against pooled OLS. H is the Hausman test for Fixed versus random 
effects. 
 
In Brennan and Buchanan‘s view, governments act as a Leviathan and 
seek to maximize their tax revenues through exploiting their tax base. Just like 
the private sector‘s desire to maximize profit, governments‘ rational behavior 
leads to increasing tax burdens and growing government size. They argue that 
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constitution  that  limits  their  access  to  tax  and  other  fiscal  instruments  that 
encourage decentralization or federalism (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980). Based 
on this premise, Nelson (1986 and 1987) finds that decentralization divides a 
monolithic power into a number of relatively homogenous governmental units, 
and in turn this may result in competition among local governments in lowering 
taxes lest taxpayers vote with their feet or investments move to jurisdictions 
with lower tax rates. As a result, decentralization may serve as a constitutional 
constraint  in  limiting  the  revenue  generating  power  of  local  governments. 
Marlow  (1988)  adds,  ―if  greater  decentralization  in  government  increases 
competition  in  the  public  sector,  then  greater  decentralization  may  lead  to 
relatively  low  tax  burdens.‖  Furthermore,  Marlow‘s  study  concludes  that  a 
decreasing federal share of total government could strengthen the importance of 
local governments in overall governmental activity. As a result, competition 
among local governments will cause them to lower tax shares. An alternate 
perspective offered by Oates contradicts these theories. Oates (1972 and 1985) 
argues that in a more decentralized system of government, local governments 
tend to increase public spending and the level of tax shares to meet their voters‘ 
demands for government effectiveness and efficiency.  
 































The result reported above gainsays Brennan and Buchanan‘s theory. This 
divergence can be explained by the lack of interjurisdictional mobility of people 
in China and the absence of explicit fiscal constraints on the taxing power of 
provincial governments. Consistent with Oates‘ theory, under a decentralized 
system,  provincial  governments  tend  to  increase tax  revenues  as  a  result  of 
fiscal  decentralization  in  order  to  meet  their  residents‘  demands  for  public 
services. Therefore, the contract system can in theory provide incentives for 
provincial governments to collect revenue. In contrast, under the tax-sharing 
system, the high sharing rate with the central government may discourage tax 
collection at the provincial government level. As Bahl and Wallich (1992) state, 
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may  not  have  the  incentive  to  increase  tax  share.  Therefore,  under  the 
recentralization  of  the  tax  system,  provincial  governments‘  tax  collection 
performance is expected to decline.  
 
5. TAX CAPACITY AND TAX EFFORT OF THE PROVINCIAL 
GOVERNMENT 
 
In this section we will report the predicted tax capacity based on the data 
and model presented in earlier sections, discuss the provincial tax authority, and 
calculate tax effort indices for each province. 
 
5.1. Tax Capacity 
 
One can predict the tax share, or tax capacity, based on the level of per 
capita GDP, agriculture‘s and industry‘s share of GDP, and population density, 
using the coefficients generated in the earlier model. In this case the fixed time 
effects are not included in the tax capacity values because we do not want the 
provinces‘ tax capacities to be influenced by the national policies.  
 
Figure n°11 : Average Tax Capacity over the period 1986–2004 
 
 
Figure 11 shows the average tax capacity of each province. Shanghai has 
the highest tax capacity and Tibet has the lowest tax capacity. Not surprisingly, 
the least developed provinces, such as Hainan, Guangxi, Guizhou, Jiangxi, have 
comparatively low abilities to raise taxes, while the most developed provinces 
have  the  highest  abilities  to  levy  taxes,  including  Tianjin,  Guangdong,  and 
Beijing. Liaoning, one of the heavy industrial centers in the northeast, ranks 
fifth in the level of tax capacity. Most of the top ten provinces are located in the 
east coast or northeast regions, except Hebei in the northern region.  Facing 
their hypothetical capability to raise tax revenue, do provincial governments 
have the incentive or authority to control the extent to which they exploit their 
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5.2. Provincial Tax Authority 
 
It is well known that China has a uniform tax system, under which tax 
rates  and tax  bases  are  determined  by  the  central government.  However,  as 
Wong  (1997)  states,  the  Chinese  tax  system  is  ad  hoc  and  negotiable,  and 
provincial governments, to some extent, are entitled to change the de facto rate 
by  offering  special  policies  to  their  SOEs.  Due  to  provincial  protectionism, 
provincial governments are incited to award tax breaks to enterprises within 
their  jurisdiction,  which  are  called  tax  expenditures.  Similarly,  if  provincial 
governments  can  get  compensation  from  the  central  government  through 
alternative  sources,  such  as  grants  and  subsidies,  for  inadequate  local  tax 
revenue, they have little incentive to collect the full tax from their tax base. To 
control  the  provincial  governments‘  tax  expenditures,  and  for  redistributive 
purposes,  the  central  government  needs  to  know  to  what  extent  provincial 




Even though tax rates are nominally set centrally, provincial governments 
still have an important impact on the amount of tax revenues raised within their 
jurisdictions.  Provincial  governments  play  the  role  of  administering  and 
collecting taxes and have a substantial degree of freedom to affect the level and 
composition of collected taxes, which determines the effective tax rate for their 
region. As Bahl and Wallich argue, ―provincial governments have a surprising 
amount of discretion in granting tax relief,‖ which is referred to as the policy of 
―stimulating enterprises through tax expenditures.‖ Provincial governments, in 
most cases, award their SOEs tax concessions, which can substantially alter the 
effective tax rates paid by SOEs. Especially with the economic reform, or ―open 
door‖ policy, markets in China tend to be increasingly competitive. Provincial 
governments are eager to attract additional investment from all over the world 
by  offering  special  tax  breaks,  tax  concessions  and  tax  holidays  (Bahl  and 
Wallich,  1992).  Nonetheless,  this  autonomy  of  provincial  governments  can 
result in serious problems if the tax concessions they offer are in conflict with 
the  central  governments‘  policy  and  can  be  detrimental  to  the  fiscal 




Provincial governments have other revenue sources beyond their own tax 
revenue, including shared taxes with the central government, extrabudgetary 
funds,  non-tax  fees,  tax  rebates,  earmarked  grants,  capital  grants,  and 
international  aid  (Bahl  and  Wallich,  1992;  Zhang  and  Zou,  1998).  These 
alternative sources have a significant impact on the tax effort, since provincial 
governments expect the central government to transfer grants so as to offset 
their deficit.  
 
In  addition,  provincial  governments  can  utilize  ―extra-budgetary 
revenues‖  to  meet  their  expenditure  needs,  which  includes  ―user  charges  of 
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direct illegitimate fee charges on farmers by provincial governments who have 
almost  all  the  autonomy  of  levying  and  spending  the  fees‖  (Wong,  1998). 
However,  this  extra-budget  revenue  falls  outside  the  control  of  the  central 
government.  This lack of accountability may hurt the transparency of the fiscal 
system  (Lin,  Tao  and  Liu,  2003).  Also,  this  provides  opportunities  for 
corruption. 
 
In  order  to  improve  the  transparency  and  accountability  of  provincial 
governments‘ tax administration, it is necessary for the central government to 
have  a  clear idea  of the extent to  which provincial governments  collect  tax 
revenues from their own tax bases. With mandatory accounting practices, the 
tax effort could be better measured by the ratio of the actual tax share to the 
estimated tax share. 
 
5.3. Tax Effort Indices 
 
In  this  section,  we  employ  the  OECD  method  to  calculate  tax  effort 
indices for each province by dividing the actual tax shares by the predicted tax 
shares.  Tax  effort  indices  suggest  the  willingness  of  provinces  to  use  the 
available tax capacity to finance public expenditures. The higher a tax effort 
index, the greater the extent to which the province has exhausted its capacity for 
further taxation. This increases the likelihood that the province will have to 
explore  other  fiscal  resources,  such  as  central  government  subsidies  and 
international aid. The national average of tax effort indices during the period 
1986 to 2004 is 1.05, close to one, which suggests that the overall extent to 
which  provinces  utilize  their  tax  capacity  is  close  to  the  ideal  one.  It  is 
noteworthy that the tax effort index of each province varies over time and the 
trends differ from each other.  
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In  the  Northeastern  region,  the  three  provinces,  Liaoning,  Jilin  and 
Heilongjiang all have low tax effort indices. The trends are gradually decreasing 
with an average tax effort of approximately 0.8, which is below one. Since the 
three  provinces  are  heavy  industrial  centers,  the  provincial  governments  are 
likely to offer tax breaks or tax holidays to their SOEs to help them in periods 
of  hardship  and  promote  their  development.  This  would  explain  their  low 
effective tax rates. 
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In the Eastern region, Anhui, Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Shandong are stable 
with mostly low tax effort indices, but all of them have a slump in 1994, which 
indicates  the  process  of  tax  effort  erosion  accelerated  under  the  economic 
reform.  These provinces end up with indices averaging 0.75 in 2004. Jiangxi 
was stable before 1994, around one, but jumped to 2.38 in 1994 and then fell to 
1.50 sharply in 1997. Shanghai‘s tax effort indices stay slightly above one. 
 
In  the  Central  South,  most  of  the  provinces‘  tax  effort  indices  stay 
between 1 and 0.5, except Hainan. Hainan, an island in the South of China, 
which experiences a dramatic development in real estate and tourism after the 
open door policy. Hainan‘s tax effort indices soared sharply to 2.54 in 1994 and 
3.11 in 1995, and fell slightly to 2.78 in 1997, but still maintain a high tax effort 
around 2.11 in 2004. This is partly because Hainan has taken advantage of the 



























































The tax effort indices of provinces in the Northwest were close to each 
other before the 1994 reform, but afterwards a divergent trend appears. Ningxia, 
Xinjiang  and  Gansu  have  average  tax  effort  indices  above  one.  In  addition, 
Gansu‘s tax effort indices fell sharply after the 1994 reform from above 1.2 to 
around one. 
 
In the Southwest, Guizhou and Yunnan (on the southwest border) have 
average tax efforts above one. Sichuan and Chongqing (located inside Sichuan) 
have average tax efforts close to one. Tibet witnessed a dramatic change from 224  Qian Wang, Chunli Shen and Heng fu-Zou 
 
1.00 in 1993 to 3.96 in 1994 and 4.68 in 1995, and then dropped to 1.13 in 
2004.  
 












































































































Nationwide, Hainan, Tibet and Inner Mongolia feature the highest tax 
effort,  while,  Shandong  and  Jiangsu,  two  coastal  regions,  have  the  lowest 
average tax effort. In general, tax collections are higher in provinces where per 
capita  income  is  lower.  In  other  words,  some  low-income  provinces  collect 
more taxes than might be predicted by their tax capacity. Poorer provinces, such 
as Inner Monoglia, Gansu, Guizhou, Yunnan, and Tibet, have above-average 
tax  efforts,  especially  Inner  Monogia  and Tibet,  60%  above  average,  which 
indicate a regressive tax effect. They may wish to look for alternative financial 
resources, such as grants from the central government or international agencies, 
because there is limited room for them to further utilize their tax bases in order 
to meet expenditure needs. 
 
At the other end of the spectrum, many of the higher income provinces 
appear to exert a lower level of tax effort: Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Shandong and 
Guangdong all register at 80% of the average tax effort.  These provinces are 
not limited by a low capacity to generate tax revenues. Rather, for different 
reasons, they have problems with exploring their potential to collect taxes. For 
example, they may need to consider lowering administrative costs. 
 
The results indicate that provinces in the coastal region generally have 
relatively  low  indices  of  tax  effort.  In  addition,  some  provinces  have 
substantially  increased  their  tax  efforts  in  recent  years  while  others  have 
experienced marked declines. The results suggest that most provinces, such as 
Yunnan, Guizhou, Sichuan, and Shanxi, are relatively stable in their tax effort 226  Qian Wang, Chunli Shen and Heng fu-Zou 
 
indices  over  the  period  1986–2004  and  are  close  to  one.  However,  some 
provinces  experience  a  dramatic  change  during  the  same  time  period;  for 
example, Tianjin and Qinghai experience a downward trend.  
 
 
5.4. Coefficient of Variation 
 
From Figure 19, the tax capacity across provinces shows a higher degree 
of  divergence  after  1994  than  before  1994.  The  coefficient  of  variation 
increased by 80% after 1994. The increased variation in tax capacity provides 
further evidence for increased disparities in the ability to collect tax revenue 
since 1994. But the variation coefficients go slightly down after 1995 and then 
go up again after 2002. This could be explained by the increasing divergence of 
economies across regions since the economic reform.  
 
The  variation  coefficient  of  tax  efforts  has  grown  from  0.24  to  0.45, 
indicating  growing  dispersion  of  tax  effort  among  the  provinces  during  the 
period 1986 to 2004. After the reform in 1986, the coefficient of variation for 
tax  effort has risen  slowly.  From  1986  to  1993,  the  coefficient of  variation 
ranged from 0.25 to 0.29. But in 1994, the coefficient of variation jumped to 
0.66. Therefore, inequity in the tax effort appears to have widened probably due 
to disparities of tax administration and tax expenditures in 1994. However, the 
variation coefficient for tax effort has fallen since 1995 (following the financial 
reforms in 1994) from 0.73 to reach 0.45 by 2004. There has been a converging 
trend of tax effort among provinces since 1995.  
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Overall, the  fiscal  reform  in  1994  has led  to highly  differentiated tax 
capacities across regions as well as a high heterogeneity of tax effort.  
 
6. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
This study provides two major policy implications regarding tax capacity 
and tax effort. The first is related to the redistribution issue. Tax capacity and 
tax effort indices could help determine the amount of resources that should be 
allocated  to  each  provincial  government.  The  second  is  related  to  the  tax 
administration of the provincial governments. 
 
6.1. Redistribution  
 
The central government could use an approach based on tax capacity and 
tax effort indices for allocating grants and subsidies among its provinces. Before 
going  any  further,  it  is  necessary  to  review  both  the  past  and  the  current 
redistribution and transfer of shared taxes, tax rebates, grants, and subsidies in 
China. Tremendous changes have occurred after 1994. 
 
In the 1980s, for the total amount of tax subject to sharing, the shared rate 
was the result of negotiations between the central government and provincial 
governments.  According  to  Bahl  and  Wallich‘s  (1992)  sharing  formula,  the 
shared  rate  was  determined  by  combining  the  original  amounts  of  tax 
collections  and  negotiation.  Historically,  the  redistribution  of  shared  taxes, 
grants, and subsidies to the provinces was determined by the ratio of the actual 
amount  of  ―allowable‖  provincial  government  expenditures  over  the  actual 
amount of provincial fixed plus shared revenues collected. Usually the least 
developed  and  minority  provinces  received  a  deficit  subsidy.  The  other 
approach was a fixed tax quota contracted with the central government. To get a 
desirable contract, provinces bargained with the central government for an ad 
hoc  tax  quota.  In  the  bargaining  process,  the  prosperous  and  high-yield 
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typically took advantage of their special economic development policies when 
negotiating with the central government for greater subsidies (Bahl and Wallich, 
1992; Zhang and Zou, 1998). 
 
After the 1994 reform, among all the grants and subsidies transferred 
from the central government to the provincial governments, tax rebates became 
the  largest  subsidy.  The  size  of  the  tax rebate is  highly  correlated  with the 
income  level,  which  is  a  regressive  effect.  Therefore,  this  method  of 
redistribution has little equalizing effects because the coastal provinces and the 
most developed regions are favored (Lin, Tao and Liu, 2003). The earmarked 
grants, the second largest transfer item, were designed as subsidies for food and 
other consumer goods, which favor urban areas, and which also still have the 
problem of a regressive effect (Wong, 1997). To compensate for this inequality 
problem, in 1996, the government introduced an equalizing transfer to aid poor 
regions. The transfer is based on variables from both the supply side, such as 
GDP, and the demand side, such as student-teacher ratios, the number of civil 
servants, and the population density (Lin, Tao and Liu, 2003). To a certain 
extent, this approach could be considered as a redistribution based on the tax 
capacity. 
 
Additionally, the tax effort of a government is viewed by some political 
entities as an indicator of the desirability for allocating further resources to that 
government. For example, international lending agencies use measures of tax 
efforts as a basis for allocating grants, thus favoring high tax effort countries 
(Leuthold, 1991). Similarly, in some countries, the central government uses the 
capability of local governments to generate tax revenues as the basis for judging 
their  performance,  and  in  turn allocates  its  grants to  each local  government 
accordingly. In addition, in countries including Canada, Australia, Germany, 
and Denmark, the redistribution system is based on tax capacity equalization. 
The  equalization  transfers  are  designed  to  offset  tax  capacity  differentials 
(Ahmad and Craig, 1997).  
 
Furthermore, both the tax capacity and tax effort should be taken into 
account when considering the redistribution. The reason for using tax effort 
indices to determine the redistribution rate is to give provincial governments 
greater incentives to exploit their own tax base. Of equal or greater importance, 
using the tax effort will, to some extent, offset the aforementioned problem of a 
regressive effect. As shown in the previous section, some provinces with low 
per  capita  GDP  have  tax  effort  indices  far  above  one,  for  example,  Inner 
Monoglia, Gansu, Guizhou, Yunnan, and Tibet. Grants and subsidies should be 
distributed to them since they are limited in their potential to utilize tax bases to 
meet their expenditure needs. 
 
Ideally speaking, according to Boadway (2001), under the equalization 
redistribution, each provincial government with a comparable level of tax effort 
should be provided with a comparable tax capacity to make a uniform set of 
public  services  available.  Therefore,  redistribution  should  reflect  all  three 
factors: differences in hypothetical tax bases, the extent to which the provincial 
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6.2. Administrative reform  
 
The final amount of tax revenue at each government level depends not 
only on the tax base and the tax rate, but also on the tax administration of 
governments.  A  low  efficient  administration  with  high  administrative  costs 
(defined as the cost for government agencies to collect tax) will decrease the tax 
effort index significantly. In this regard, low tax effort indices might be seen as 
reflecting  administrative  problems  of  provincial  governments,  such  as  the 
failure  to  reform  public  administration  and  the  inefficiencies  introduced  by 
under-qualified government officials and by the intervention of enterprises in 
the provincial administration. 
 
The  administrative  reform,  which  aims  at  both  lowering  the 
administrative cost and improving administrative efficiency, has been carried 
out  from  the  central  government  to  all  levels  of  subnational  governments. 
Before 1994, it was the provincial tax administration‘s responsibility to collect 
tax  revenue  and  submit  it  to  the  central  government.  In  order  to  improve 
administrative efficiency and to limit the provincial tax administration power, in 
1994, the central government split the tax administration into two parts, namely 
the national tax administration and provincial tax administration. The former is 
in charge of collecting central taxes and shared taxes. The latter is responsible 
for local taxes only. 
 
The  central  government  can  judge  the  achievement  of  provincial 
government officials by examining their tax effort indices. For the provinces 
with tax effort indices situated significantly below one, such as the two coastal 
provinces Shandong and Jiangsu, such a judgment may introduce a potentially 
serious problem concerning the officials‘ efficiency and special relationships 
with enterprises, in that the most profitable enterprises may end up paying less 




This  study  has  shed  light  on  the  tax  performance  of  provincial 
governments  in  China  The  analysis  carried  out  in  this  study  comprises  two 
steps. First, we use a fixed time effects and random provincial effects model to 
analyze  the  statistical  relationship  between  tax  shares  and  economic  and 
demographic  variables,  including  per  capita  GDP,  the  share  of  agriculture, 
industry  and trade,  and  the  population  density.  In  general, the  decentralized 
fiscal system over the period of 1986 to 1993 had a positive impact on the tax 
share of GDP, whereas the recentralized system over the period from 1994 to 
2004 dramatically decreased the tax share of GDP.  
 
Secondly,  we  employ  the  estimated  coefficients  from  the  model  to 
calculate tax capacity and tax effort indices for each province in China. Tax 
effort  indices  for  each  province  vary  over  time  and  provincial  trends  show 
significant differences. The results suggest that some prosperous and coastal 
provinces, such as Shandong, Jiangsu, and Guangdong, which have a high tax 
capacity, show relatively low tax efforts. These provinces may consider placing 230  Qian Wang, Chunli Shen and Heng fu-Zou 
 
greater emphasis on administrative reforms as a means to increase local tax 
revenues and therefore reduce their reliance on other funding resources. On the 
other hand, some poorer inland provinces, such as Guizhou, Gansu, and Tibet, 
have  a  low  tax  capacity  and  a  high  tax  effort.  They  may  wish  to  look  for 
alternative financial resources because there is limited room for them to exploit 
their  tax  bases  to  meet  expenditure  needs.  The  results  for  the  variation 
coefficient of tax capacity and tax effort indices indicate that the fiscal reform in 
1994 has led to greater differentiation of tax capacities across provinces and 
also to more divergence in tax efforts.  
 
The findings from this study have important policy implications. First, 
tax  capacity  and  tax  effort  indices  could  help  the  central  government  to 
redistribute grants and subsidies to each province.  Second, these measures can 
also help to make judgments about the administrative efficiency of provincial 
governments.  Along  with  information  on  expenditure  needs,  alternative 
financial  sources,  and  political  and  cultural  differences  among  provinces, 
measuring  tax  capacity  and  effort  can  provide  valuable,  and  somewhat 




Table n°1 : Average values over the period  1986–2004. 
 
Province  GDPPC  GDPpc      
growth 
Tax                 
share 
Tax        
growth  Buoyancy  Agri          
share 
Agri        
growth 
Indu           
share 
Indu              
growth  Popden  Tax        
Capacity 
Tax          
effort 
Shanghai  21478.32  15.96%  13.71%  12.97%  0.98  2.63%  -10.94%  51.94%  0.93%  2100  0.16  1.16 
Beijing  16229.70  15.55%  14.97%  15.97%  1.17  5.42%  -10.40%  36.31%  -1.31%  695  0.14  1.68 
Tianjin  11775.42  15.61%  12.59%  8.55%  0.66  6.32%  -8.40%  49.79%  3.17%  787  0.16  1.08 
Zhejiang  9645.20  18.17%  7.55%  15.57%  1.23  16.25%  -6.69%  45.14%  1.56%  431  0.13  0.76 
Jiangsu  8555.75  17.68%  6.23%  15.41%  1.30  16.98%  -6.05%  46.46%  2.94%  683  0.14  0.65 
Guangdong  8315.00  17.40%  8.01%  18.42%  1.32  16.70%  -5.30%  40.27%  1.82%  366  0.15  0.76 
Liaoning  7877.70  13.98%  8.26%  10.61%  0.89  13.19%  -3.36%  45.06%  0.36%  276  0.14  0.85 
Fujian  7673.95  18.50%  8.45%  20.76%  0.88  21.58%  -0.89%  35.35%  1.40%  264  0.12  1.00 
Shandong  6927.15  17.63%  5.36%  15.57%  1.11  20.70%  -2.44%  42.40%  2.17%  566  0.13  0.63 
Heilongjiang  6155.60  14.28%  8.65%  8.80%  0.71  16.22%  -1.34%  48.31%  0.79%  78  0.14  0.84 
Chongqing  5637.67  10.27%  4.57%  14.40%  1.79  18.69%  33.98%  34.03%  -0.45%  376  0.12  0.83 
Hebei  5419.70  17.04%  6.24%  10.09%  0.67  19.95%  -4.42%  42.78%  10.80%  336  0.13  0.69 
Hainan  4983.25  15.39%  6.47%  16.90%  0.97  38.83%  1.08%  13.79%  -1.09%  209  0.10  1.92 
Xinjiang  4811.53  15.11%  5.26%  16.93%  1.95  27.90%  -3.15%  28.32%  15.66%  10  0.12  1.06 
Inner Mongolia  4695.35  16.80%  9.30%  17.95%  1.27  27.58%  -2.74%  31.16%  0.78%  19  0.11  1.59 
Jilin  4647.89  14.64%  7.20%  10.59%  1.02  24.32%  -1.61%  37.97%  1.72%  135  0.12  0.93 
Hubei  4551.95  14.94%  6.22%  10.15%  1.04  24.31%  -1.67%  38.13%  0.36%  304  0.12  0.74 
Shanxi  4128.60  16.44%  8.43%  11.07%  0.87  13.04%  21.51%  43.42%  0.05%  197  0.14  0.86 
Hunan  4010.10  15.49%  5.99%  11.10%  0.95  29.11%  -0.08%  32.20%  -0.59%  302  0.11  0.85 
Henan  3940.95  16.64%  5.74%  11.66%  0.92  26.29%  2.69%  38.95%  0.24%  543  0.12  0.74 
Qinghai  3917.40  13.57%  6.63%  12.14%  1.08  19.97%  -2.63%  31.02%  0.71%  7  0.12  0.90 
Anhui  3609.90  14.28%  6.02%  12.00%  1.29  28.05%  -3.82%  36.76%  0.73%  429  0.12  0.83 
Shaanxi  3460.15  15.19%  7.03%  13.21%  1.10  20.80%  -2.25%  34.20%  0.66%  169  0.12  0.92 
Ningxia  3369.37  13.57%  7.96%  14.82%  1.39  21.45%  3.03%  34.28%  0.03%  77  0.12  1.06 
Guangxi  3321.40  16.34%  7.32%  13.65%  0.98  31.23%  4.55%  28.85%  -0.77%  191  0.11  1.07 
Yunnan  3314.20  15.52%  11.66%  14.00%  1.00  26.77%  -1.37%  35.43%  1.19%  102  0.12  1.57 
Jiangxi  3258.63  15.37%  7.70%  15.78%  0.81  30.28%  3.71%  29.84%  -1.37%  240  0.11  1.33 
Sichuan  3222.37  15.68%  4.61%  13.47%  0.67  28.87%  6.91%  33.04%  -1.06%  167  0.12  0.96 
Tibet  3068.11  13.28%  4.29%  14.19%  1.42  39.27%  29.70%  7.59%  -2.77%  2  0.08  1.70 
Gansu  2605.68  12.93%  9.25%  9.12%  0.90  23.09%  -0.42%  36.15%  0.37%  53  0.12  1.16 
Guizhou  2018.05  13.39%  9.26%  13.67%  1.47  32.26%  -2.23%  32.26%  1.29%  200  0.11  1.45   Région et Développement  231 
 
 
Figure n°5 : Average per Capita GDP (in thousand RMB Yuan)  
over the period 1986–2004 
 
 




Figure n°6 : Average Industrial Share of GDP  
over the period 1986–2004 
 
 
Source : China Data Online (1986–2004). 
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Figure n°7 : Average Agricultural Share of GDP  
over the period 1986–2004 
 
 
Source : China Data Online (1986–2004). 
 
 
Figure n°8 : Average Population Density (Inhabitants per Sq.Km)  
over the period 1986–2004 
 
 
Source : China Data Online (1986–2004). 
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Figure n°9 : Average Trade Share of GDP (%GDP) 
over the period 1986–2004 
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LA POLITIQUE FISCALE DES GOUVERNEMENTS LOCAUX  
EN CHINE : UNE ANALYSE DE LA PERFORMANCE  
FISCALE DES PROVINCES  
 
Résumé  –  Cet  article  cherche  à  comparer  la  performance  des  politiques 
fiscales  régionales  entre  1986  et  2004  en  Chine  en  mettant  plus  particu-
li￨rement  l’accent  sur  les  effets  des  réformes  majeures  effectuées  dans  les 
ann￩es 1980 et en 1994. Dans un premier temps, en s’appuyant sur des donn￩es 
de panel, nous utilisons un modèle hybride qui combine effets temporels fixes et 
effets r￩gionaux al￩atoires, permettant d’analyser la relation entre le poids de 
la  fiscalité  dans  le  PIB  et  les  variables  économiques  et  démographiques 
régionales. Les résultats obtenus montrent que le système décentralisé de la 
période 1986-1993 a eu des effets plus bénéfiques sur la croissance du PIB que 
le système, plus centralisé, de la période 1994-2004. Dans un deuxième temps, 
nous  proposons  la  construction  d’indicateurs  r￩gionaux  repr￩sentant  le 
potentiel de recettes fiscales additionnelles et permettant d’analyser l’impact 





   